ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to study first order Mean field games subject to a linear controlled dynamics on R d . For this kind of problems, we define Nash equilibria (called Mean Field Games equilibria) as Borel probability measures on the space of admissible trajectories and we prove the existence and uniqueness of such equilibria. Moreover, we study the regularity of mild solutions: we prove Hölder regularity of Mean Field Games equilibria and fractional semiconcavity for the value function of the underlying optimal control problem. In conclusion, we presents the PDEs system associated with the Mean Field Games problem and we prove that the class of mild solutions coincide with the class of weak solutions.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the first order Mean Field Games problem, using the Lagrangian formalism, where agents are subject to a linear controlled dynamics on R d . The model we have in mind is a game or a system for which one is interested in control not the velocity of each agents but its acceleration. Therefore, the Lagrangian function and terminal cost of the common optimization problem depend on high order derivates of the admissible paths on R d . We recall that Mean Field Games theory has been introduced simultaneously, but independently, by Lasry and Lions in [15] , [16] and [17] , and by M. Huang, R. P. Malhamé and P. E. Caine in [14] . This theory is devoted to the study of deterministic and stochastic differential games with a large number of players, where each agent is rational and has a small influence on the whole evolution of the model. where, for each time t ∈ [0, T ], we have that m is a Borel probability measure on R d . More precisely, we define the metric space
endowed with uniform metric · ∞ and we consider Borel probability measures η supported on Γ T with a finite first order moment. Then, given the evaluation map e t : Γ T → R d we define m t = e t ♯η, where ♯ stands for the push-forward operator.
The first problem we deal with is the definition of Nash equilibria (Mean Field Games equilibria) for this class of problems. Inspired by recent works on Mean Field Games, see for instance [8] and [13] , given an initial distribution m 0 ∈ P(R d ) we define Nash equilibria as probability measures supported on minimizing curves of the above functional such that e 0 ♯η = m 0 . Then, we are able to prove that such measures exist and we find conditions yielding uniqueness, see, respectively, Theorem 4.5 and Theorem 4.8.
Then, we study the regularity of the so called mild solutions of the Mean Field Games given by a pair (V, m) ∈ C([0, T ]×R d )×C([0, T ]; P α (R d )) where m t is the distribution of the agents at time t ∈ [0, T ] and V is the value function of the above optimal control problem. More precisely, we first prove that the map t → m t is 1 2 -Hölder continuous in time, see Theorem 5.1 and then, we prove the first main results of the paper which states that the value function V is locally semiconcave on [0, T ] × R d linearly in space and with fractional semiconcave modulus in time, see Theorem 5.2. Moreover, by standard tools of optimal control theory we get that V is locally Lipschitz continuous, see Theorem 5.4 , on [0, T ] × R d . Furthermore, we show that, under some extra assumptions on the Lagrangian function, it is possible to prove that there exists at least one Mean Field Games equilibrium η such that the associated evolutionary distribution m t = e t ♯η is Lipschitz continuous in time. Consequently, the corresponding value function of a mild solution, associated with a Lipschitz Mean Field Games equilibrium, becomes locally semiconcave in [0, T ] × R d with linear modulus of semiconcavity. In conclusion, we prove the third main result of this paper that is the equivalence between mild solution of the Mean Field Games system and the weak solutions of the system, Theorem 6.2.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we fix the notation used throughout the paper and we recall some notions and results from measure theory and control theory; in Section 3, we explain the general setting of the problem and we prove some preliminary results which are used later; in Section 4, we prove the existence and uniqueness of Mean Field Games equilibria; in Section 5, we study the regularity of the mild solutions of the Mean Field Games problem; in Section 6, we present the Mean Field Games system derived from the optimal control problem and we analyze the structure of the weak solutions of the system; in Appendix, we give the proofs of technical results used before in this paper.
2. PRELIMINARIES 2.1. Notation. We write below a list of symbols used throughout this paper.
• Denote by N the set of positive integers, by R d the d-dimensional real Euclidean space, by ·, · the Euclidean scalar product, by | · | the usual norm in R d , and by B R the open ball with center 0 and radius R.
• Let Λ be a real n × n matrix. Define the norm of Λ by
• Let A be a Lebesgue-measurable subset of R d . Denote by L n (A) the n-dimensional Lebesgue measure of A. Denote by 1 A : R n → {0, 1} the characteristic function of A, i.e.,
• Let f be a real-valued function on R d . The set
is called the set of reachable gradiets of f at x.
Denote by L p (A) the space of Lebesgue-measurable functions f with f p,A < ∞, where
stands for the function space of bounded uniformly continuous functions on
stands for the space of bounded functions on R d with bounded uniformly continuous first and second derivatives.
stands for the function space of k-times continuously differentiable functions on R d , and
2.2. Measure Theory. Denote by B(R d ) the Borel σ-algebra on R d and by P(R d ) the space of Borel probability measures on R d . The support of a measure µ ∈ P(R n ), denoted by supp(µ), is the closed set defined by
We say that a sequence
For p ∈ [1, +∞), the Wasserstein space of order p is defined as
where x 0 ∈ R d is arbitrary. Given any two measures m and m
The Wasserstein distance of order p between m and m ′ is defined by
The distance d 1 is also commonly called the Kantorovich-Rubinstein distance and can be characterized by a useful duality formula (see, for instance, [18] ) as follows
. We now recall that weak- * convergence is equivalent to convergence in the metric space [18] ) and useful compactness criterion for subsets of
Let K be a subset of P(R d ). We say that the set K has uniformly integrable p-moment with respect some (and thus any)x ∈ R d if and only if
|x −x| p µ(dx) = 0, uniformly with respect to µ ∈ K. Let (X 1 , S 1 , µ) be a measure space, (X 2 , S 2 ) a measurable space, and f : X 1 → X 2 a measurable map. The push-forward of µ through f is the measure f ♯µ on (X 2 , S 2 ) defined by
The push-forward has the property that a measurable map g : X 2 → R is integrable with respect to f ♯µ if and only if g • f is integrable on X 1 with respect to µ. In this case, we have that
We conclude this introductory section recalling the so-called disintegration theorem.
Theorem 2.4 (Disintegration Theorem
. Let X and Y be Radon separable metric spaces, let µ be a Borel probability measure on X and let π : X → Y be Borel map. Define ν = π♯µ ∈ P(Y ). Then there exists a µ-a.e. uniquely determined Borel measurable family of probability measures {ν y } y∈Y ⊂ P(X) such that
See, for instance, [1, Theorem 5.
(a)
Let L be a strict Tonelli Lagrangian and, let f :
and the gradient D x f exists and is continuous; in addition, there exists a real positive constant k such that
Define the following optimal control problem
Given the optimal control problem (OC), the value function is defined as follows
We recall that the value function V satisfies the dynamic programming principle, i.e. for any (t, x) ∈ (0, T ) × R d and any given s ∈ (t, T ) we have that
where γ is a solution of the controlled dynamics associated with u. Define the pseudo-Hamiltonian function and the Hamiltonian function as follows: 
See, for instance, [6, Theorem 7.4.17] .
Observe that the adjoint equation (iii) could be also written in the following way
As usual, one can write the maximum principle in form of Hamiltonian system as follows.
Theorem 2.7. Let L be a strict Tonelli Lagrangian and assume (f) and (g). Let u * be an optimal control of the problem (OC) and let γ * be the associated minimizing curve. Let p be the dual arc given by Theorem 2.6. Then, the pair (γ * , p) solves the system
Consequently, we have that γ * and p belong to
SETTING OF THE MEAN FIELD GAMES PROBLEM
3.1. Assumptions. Throughout this paper we will assume that the Lagrangian L :
(ii) there exists a constant
Remark 3.1. Note that, in hypothesis (L3), we are assuming that the Lagrangian L is a strict Tonelli Lagrangian, see Definition 2.5, uniformly with respect the measure variable. Moreover, if L satisfies assumptions (L3) (i)-(iii), then it is not difficult to check that there exist constants c 0 and c 1 such that
Fix a time horizon T > 0. Let A and B be real matrices, d × d and d × k, respectively. Consider the control system defined by
we denote by γ(· ; x, u) the solution of the differential equation (3.1) such that γ(0) = x and define the metric space
endowed with the uniform norm, denoted by · ∞ . Moreover, define
Let α > 1 and let m 0 be a Borel probability measure in
Let R be a real constant such that R ≥ [m 0 ] α and define the following space of probability measures on Γ T ,
where e t (γ) = γ(t) is the evaluation map.
and define the measure η = p♯m 0 ∈ P(Γ T ). Note that, for any x ∈ R d the curve e tA x is an admissible curve associated with the control u ≡ 0.
Then, the following holds:
(1) for any bounded continuous function f on R d , we have that e 0 ♯η = m 0 . Indeed,
(2) the α-moment of η is bounded:
Definitions and first properties. For any
and the associated optimal control problem
Notice that the restriction to controls u ∈ L 2 (0, T ; R k ) is due to the structure assumptions we imposed on L.
We denote by Γ * η (x) the set of curves associated with an optimal control u * , i.e.
Proposition 3.4. There exists a real positive constant K such that for any x ∈ R d , any η ∈ P α (Γ T ) and any optimal control u * of (3.3), we have that
Proof. Let x be a fixed point in R d . By Remark 3.1 and the optimality of u * we have that
Therefore, from the above inequalities we deduce that
Thus, the proof is complete.
Proof. Since γ * is a solution of (3.1) associated with u * , we know that
Thus, we have that
and by Hölder's inequality
Proposition 3.6. Under the above assumptions the following holds true.
(1) For any η ∈ P m 0 (Γ T , R) we have that
Consequently, the family of measures
Proof. We are going to prove only the point (1), see [8, Lemma 3 .2] for a proof of (2) and (3).
(1) Given η ∈ P m 0 (Γ T , R) we have that
where the last inequality holds by definition of P m 0 (Γ T , R). So, by remark (2.2) the family of measures 
MEAN FIELD GAMES EQUILIBRIA: EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS
At this point, it is not difficult to prove that for any given α > 0 and any given initial measure m 0 ∈ P α (R d ) there exists R 0 ≥ 0 such that for any R ≥ R 0 there exists at least one Mean Field Games equilibrium η ∈ P m 0 (Γ T , R) and that, under a classical monotonicity assumption, such an equilibrium is unique.
For the sake of completeness, we give below the key ideas and steps to prove the existence of a Mean Field Games equilibrium, following the appoach in [8] .
Given m 0 ∈ P α (R d ) and given η ∈ P m 0 (Γ T , R) we recall that by the Theorem 2.4 there exists a unique Borel measurable family of probability measures {η x } x∈R d on Γ T such that
Define the set-valued map
that associates with any η ∈ P m 0 (Γ T , R) the set
. It is easy to realize that a given η ∈ P m 0 (Γ T , R) is a Mean Field Games equilibrium if and only if η is a fixed point of the above set-valued map, that is, η ∈ E(η). Therefore, in order to prove the existence of Mean Field Games equilibria, we appeal to Kakutani's fixed point theorem, see for instance [4] , which provides conditions under which the set-valued map E has a fixed point.
We check the validity of such conditions in the following Lemmas.
Moreover, from Proposition 3.4 we get that u i 2 ≤ K. Therefore, up to a subsequence, we obtain that there existsū ∈ L 2 (0, T ) such that u i ⇀ū in L 2 . Hence, we are reduced to prove that
Point 1:
By definition of γ i , we obtain that
Thus, letting i → ∞ by the weak L 2 convergence of u i we obtain that
This concludes the proof of point 1.
Point 2:
We now prove that
By assumptions on G, it follows that
Therefore, it suffices to prove that
By assumption (L3) (iii) and Lipschitz condition (L1) it follows that B → 0 as i → 0. Thus, we have to prove now that the functional
is weakly lower semicontinuous with respect to the L 2 topology. Define, for every λ ∈ R,
By assumption (L3) on convexity of the Lagrangian L with respect to controls, we get that the sets X λ are convex. Furthermore, such sets are closed in the strong L 2 topology. Indeed, if
e. up to a subsequence. Thus, by the continuity of L we have that L(γ(t), u i (t), e t ♯η) → L(γ(t), u ∞ (t), e t ♯η) a.e. and by the growth assumption L is bounded from below. Therefore, by Fatou's Lemma we obtain that u ∞ ∈ X λ . Hence, since the sets X λ are convex and strongly closed it implies that they are closed also in the L 2 weak topology. This concludes the proof of point 2.
Corollary 4.2. The set-valued map
is non-empty. Moreover, E(η) is convex and compact.
Proof. We, first, prove that given 
3) associated with η. Define, now, the measureη as follows
Thus, we need to prove thatη ∈ P m 0 (Γ T , R). Indeed, e 0 ♯η = m 0 by definition and
where the last inequality holds by Corollary 3.5. Therefore, we deduce that
we obtain thatη ∈ P m 0 (Γ T , R). Consequently, that E(η) is non-empty. The proof of convexity is a straightforward application of [8, Lemma 3.5]. In conclusion, for any η ∈ P m 0 (Γ T ) the sets E(η) are compact, with respect to the d 1 distance, since E(η) ⊂ P m 0 (Γ T ) which are compact by Theorem 2.3.
Proof. The proof of this Lemma is a straightforward application of [8, Lemma 3.6].
Theorem 4.5 (Existence of Mean Field Games equilibria). Let
R ≥ R(α, [m 0 ] α ), where R(α, [m 0 ] α )
is defined as in Lemma 4.3. Then, the set-valued map E has a fixed point.
Proof. By the above lemmas the assumptions of Kakutani's fixed point theorem (see, for instance, [4] ) are satisfied and therefore, there exists a fixed point of the map E, that isη ∈ E(η) andη is a Mean Field Games equilibrium. From now on, we denote by γ(s; t, x, u) the solution to the following control system
Moreover, we introduce the following notation (4.2) m η t = e t ♯η, for any η ∈ P m 0 (Γ T , R).
Definition 4.6 (Mild solutions of Mean Field Games problem) We say that
(V, m) ∈ C([0, T ] × R d ) × C([0, T ], P α (R d )
) is a mild solution for the Mean Field Games problem if there exists a Mean Field Games equilibrium
η ∈ P m 0 (Γ T ) such that (i) m t = m η t for all t ∈ [0
, T ]; (ii) V can be represented as the value function of the optimal control problem 3.3, that is
Note that the above definition is well-posed since we have proved so far that there exists at least one Mean Field Games equilibrium and the map
is continuous with respect to d 1 . Moreover, for the same reasons we know that there exists at least one mild solution of the Mean Field Games problem. In order to study the uniqueness of the Mean Field Games equilibrium, we focus the attention on a particular Lagrangian function, that is
where ℓ and F satisfy the assumptions (L1)-(L3). Definition 4.7 (Monotonicity) We say that Ψ : Moreover, we will prove that there exists at least one Mean Field Games equilibrium η ∈ P α (Γ T , R) such that t → m η t is Lipschitz continuous.
We say that Ψ is strictly monotone if (4.5) holds true and
Given the control system (3.1), we have that the Hamiltonian associated with the Lagrangian function L is defined as
The Hamiltonian H can be explicitly written as follows
Moreover, it is easy to check that there exists a constant
Local Lipschitz continuity and local fractional semiconcavity of the Value function.
Let (V, m η ) a mild solution of the Mean Field Games problem associated with a Mean Field Games equilibrium η ∈ P α (Γ T , R).
In this section, we prove that, given any equilibrium η, the associated measures {m We recall that V is defined as the value function Proof. By definition of d 1 , we have that
where Lip 1 (R d ) is the set of Lipschitz continuous functions such that the Lipschitz constant is equal to 1.
We recall that, since η is a Mean Field Games equilibrium, we know that it is supported on the set of all minimizing curves of problem (3.3). Thus, for any x ∈ R d , given an optimal pair (u * , γ * ), by Proposition 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 we deduce that
Therefore, recalling that x = γ(0) we have that
where the constant κ depends on the moment of m 0 which we know is bounded by construction. Thus, the proof is complete.
In order to prove the semiconcavity of the value function V , we need to add the following assumption on the Lagrangian L and terminal cost G:
(L5) There exists two constants w L ≥ 0 and w G ≥ 0 such that for any λ ∈ [0, 1], any radius R > 0, any u ∈ R k , any x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ B R , and any m ∈ P 1 (R d ) such that
Theorem 5.2 (Local fractional semiconcavity of V ). Let R be a positive radius. Then, there exists a constant
Proof. We first prove that the value function V is locally semiconcave in space uniformly in time and then, that it is locally semiconcave in space and time. Let R > 0 be a positive radius and fix
Consider, first, the expression involving only the terminal costs
By assumptions (L1) and (L5) we deduce that
By the definition of γ, γ + and γ − we have that these curves are solutions of (3.1). Therefore, we get that there exists a real positive constant W such that
Hence, we deduce that
By almost similar arguments, one can prove that also the integral term in (5.3) is bounded by a constant times |h| 2 . This proves that V is locally semiconcave in space uniformly in time. We prove now that V is locally semiconcave on
and let h ∈ R d and δ ∈ R be such that x + h, x − h ∈ B R and 0 < t − δ < t + δ < T . Let u * be an optimal control for (t, x) and define the following control function in
By the Dynamic Programming Principle (2.1), we get that
Thus, by the first parte of the proof term I is bounded by a constant times |h| 2 + |δ| 2 . Now, we have to estimate term II. Let us denote, for simplicity, by γ − the curve γ(· ; t − δ, x − h, u * ).
Then, by assumption (L1) we have that there exists a constant D ≥ 0 such that
Since η is a Mean Field Games equilibrium we know by Theorem 5.1 that the generated measure {m
-Hölder continuous in time with respect to the d 1 distance. Therefore,
Now, we have to estimate the distance between the curves γ − and γ. For, we recall that since γ − and γ are solutions of (3.1) we know that
By [6, Theorem 7.4.6], without loss of generality, we can assume that u * belongs to L ∞ and consequently,ū ∈ L ∞ . Thus, we obtain that for any s ∈ [t, t + δ]
Hence, plugging inequalities (5.5) and (5.6) into (5.4) the proof is complete.
Remark 5.3. We note that Theorem 5.2 guarantees that the function x → V (t, x) is linearly semiconcave, locally uniformly in time.
The proof of the following theorem is given in Appendix A since the techniques we have used to prove it are classical in optimal control theory.
Theorem 5.4. V is locally Lipschitz continuous on
[0, T ] × R d .
Lipschitz regularity of Mean Field Games equilibrium.
Define the following class of curves on
and define P
is non-empty. Following the construction we have done in Remark 3.2, let p :
and define η = p♯m 0 . Therefore, by Remark 3.2, we only need to prove that m η ∈ Lip(P α ). Indeed,
Since the function t → e At x is Lipschitz continuous in any compact subintervals of R we get the conclusion. 
. Let u * be an optimal control for the problem (3.3) and let γ * be the minimizing curve generated by u. Then, there exists a real positive constant Q 1 such that γ * ∞ ≤ Q 1 (1 + |x|).
Remark 5.7. Note that, by construction and the explicit form of the Hamiltonian H given in (5.1), assumption (H1) can be restated in terms of the Lagrangian L as follows
, by the maximum principle in Hamiltonian form, Theorem 2.7, we have that there exists an arc p
, and by the transversality condition in Theorem 2.6,
Thus, by (5.2) we obtain that
where the last inequality follows by Corollary 3.5 for some constant β ≥ 0. Thus, we have reduced the problem to prove that the dual arc p * is bounded. By Theorem 2.7, we have thatṗ
Therefore
and, since the terminal cost is Lipschitz, we know by the transversality condition that p(T ) is bounded. Thus the proof is complete.
We recall the definition of the set-valued map E given in the Section 3, that is
and let µ be a Borel probability measure in E(η). We want to prove that for any
where the last inequality follows by Proposition 5.6. Therefore, observing that x = γ(0) and µ belongs to P m 0 (Γ T , R), we obtain the conclusion. Proof. It is sufficient to prove that the set-valued map E : P
has a fix point and in order to prove it we want to use Kakutani's fixed point theorem.
We recall that by Theorem 4.4 we have that the map E has closed graph and so also the restriction of E on P
Therefore, all the assumptions of Kakutani's fixed point theorem are satisfied and this concludes the proof. 
MEAN FIELD GAMES: PDES SYSTEM
6.1. Optimal syntesis. In order to deduce the PDE system for our Mean Field Games problem, we have to derive first some optimality conditions for the following problem:
As usual, let V be the value function of the above (OC) problem.
Let p 0 be a point in D *
By definition of reachable gradient, there exists a sequence {x k } k∈N such that
Letū k andγ k be, respectively, an optimal control and an optimal trajectory with starting point (t 0 , x k ). By the maximum principle (Theorem 2.6), we have that there exists an absolutely continuous arcp k such that
By the maximum principle in Hamiltonian form (Theorem 2.7)
Since the sequence {x k } k∈N is convergent, by Corollary 3.5 and Proposition 5.6 we obtain that {γ k } k∈N is equibounded and equicontinuous.
Moreover, by (6.1) we have that for any t ≥ t 0
Thus, it easily follows that also the sequence of dual arcs {p k } k∈N is equibounded and equicontinuous. Therefore, there exist an absolutely continuous arcp and a curveγ such thatp k →p andγ k →γ, uniformly as k → ∞. Since L is a strict Tonelli Lagrangian, see Definition 2.5, we have that there exists a constant
Moreover, since x ∈ B R we deduce by [6, Theorem 7.4.6 ] that there exists a constantkappa ≥ 0 such that u k ∞ ≤κ. Consequently, we obtain that
,ū) as k → ∞. Therefore, passing to the limit in (6.1) we get thatp is a solution of the limit equation and by the maximum principle the pair (γ,p) solves system (6.2). In conclusion, as k → ∞ in the value function we obtain that the curveγ is a minimizer for (t 0 , x 0 ).
Weak solutions.
In this section, we consider the case of splitted Langrangian, that is L is of the form (4.4).
We recall that, given the control system (3.1), the Hamiltonian associated with the Lagrangian function L is defined as (ii) V is a continuous viscosity solution of Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Proof. First, we show that any mild solutions (V, m η ) is a weak solution. Let V be the value function defined as in Definition 4.6, in expression (4.3). Then, it is wellknown that it is a continuous viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation in system (6.3) and satisfies the terminal condition. Hence, we are left to prove that m η is a solution of the continuity equation in system (6.3) in the sense of distributions.
Indeed, for any ϕ ∈ C ∂ t ϕ(t, γ(t)) + D x ϕ(t, γ(t)),γ(t) η(dγ).
Since η ∈ P m 0 (Γ T , R) is a Lipschitz Mean Field Games equilibrium we know that η is supported on the minimizers of problem (3.3). So, by Theorem 2.7 we know thaṫ γ(t) = −D p H γ(t), D x V (t, γ(t)) . The conclusion follows by integrating the above equalities over [0, T ]. Now, let (V, m) be a weak solution of Mean Field Games system. Since V is a viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation we know that it can be represented by the formula (4.3) in Definition 4.6. Hence, we only have to prove that there exists a Mean Field Games equilibrium η such that m t = e t ♯η.
Since m is a solution of the continuity equation in the sense of distributions, by the superposition principle [1, Theorem 8.2.1] we know that there exists a probability measure µ ∈ P(Γ T ) such that m t = e t ♯µ and µ-a.e. is a solution of the following equation (6.4)γ(t) = −D p H(γ(t), D x V (t, γ(t))), t ∈ [0, T ].
As m 0 = e 0 ♯µ, by Theorem 2.4 there exists a family of Borel probability measures µ x , for any x ∈ supp(m 0 ), such that
Since m 0 is absolutely continuous with compact support and the value function V is locally Lipschitz continuous, it follows that m 0 -a.e. and µ x -a.e. γ is a solution of (6.4) such that γ(0) = x. Therefore, by the optimal synthesis explained above, such a curve γ is a minimizer of the underlying optimal control problem. Hence, the measures µ x are supported on minimizing curves of the optimal control problem. Consequently, µ is a Mean Field Games equilibrium for m 0 .
The following result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 6.2 and Theorem 4.8. 
